.

Washington and New Delhi spent more than two decades developing what had been among the most productive partnerships of the post–Cold War era. Now, the relationship faces one of its most significant challenges as trust between the two countries has frayed over tariffs, oil politics, and global competition.

“We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years, that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term, have just come completely unraveled,” said Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The trust is gone.”

The backsliding accelerated after President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on all Indian imports earlier this year over New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil. The tariff, initially at 25 percent, will increase to 50 percent on August 27. Instead of persuading India to change its oil-buying behavior, the tariff has pushed the country into Moscow’s and even Beijing’s arms.

India’s national security adviser visited Moscow earlier this month, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held talks in Russia, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up a trip in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will soon travel to China for the first time in more than seven years, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to welcome him in Moscow before the end of the year. The eastward pivot, analysts say, is more than just symbolic.

India’s public opinion has also turned sharply against what many view as Washington’s interference with internal affairs. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

Despite initial reluctance at the start of the war, state-run refiners relaunched Russian oil purchases after discounts of six to seven percent became available. Russia now accounts for 35 percent of India’s total crude imports, compared to 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. Russia, for its part, is also open to broadening the terms of trade. “Moscow is set to continue shipping crude oil, oil products, thermal and coking coal to India, but there is also potential for the export of Russian LNG,” said Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov.

Strings and Domestic Politics

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst based in Washington, said that Trump’s tariffs are not the only reason New Delhi is tacking toward the East. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” he said.

Much of New Delhi’s actions are likely performative, and a small number of them are more enduring, Feigenbaum added. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India had already started to wean itself off of Russian arms purchases before the Ukraine war, making large acquisitions of weapons from the United States, France, and Israel in the last decade. With the onset of the invasion, though, India’s energy trade with Russia jumped. “The Russia-India oil trade is almost a validation of India’s belief that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what,” said Kugelman.

For Modi, a bonus of breaking with Washington is the political capital he earns at home for standing up to U.S. pressure. He has been able to demonstrate that his priority is protecting the livelihoods of India’s farmers, small businesses, and young workers — all groups with strong domestic political importance. Kugelman added that India had already given concessions to Washington over tariffs, worker repatriation, and other issues. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

Washington, too, is now expressing frustration. Former White House trade adviser Peter Navarro, in an op-ed for the Financial Times, said New Delhi’s oil purchases were “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” He wrote that tariffs were necessary “to hurt India where it hurts most — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

Bad Blood

The fall in relations is particularly sour when considering past milestones in the relationship, including the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, in which the U.S. agreed to provide India with fuel and technology despite its never signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That deal and the relationship before and after it had managed to compartmentalize the disagreements so they did not escalate and infect other areas.

The current moment is different. The United States has long viewed India as the main democratic bulwark against Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region, a policy pursued by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. With frictions over trade spilling into the defense and intelligence arena, though, the logic of this cooperation is at risk of unraveling.

“Countering China has been the glue binding this relationship,” Kugelman said. “But if the U.S.–India relationship continues this free fall, it will be very difficult to sustain.”

Feigenbaum points to the irony of the current moment. “Then, India was leveraging its partnership to signal to then-foe China that it had options. Now they’re working with the Chinese to signal Washington rather than the other way around.”

The message from India’s side is clear: It will chart its course, even if that means deepening ties with America’s rivals.